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Writers of military history have often been keen to highlight missed opportunities in the campaigns and battles that they discuss. Indeed, there is a whole genre of military history books devoted to showing how campaigns and battles could have been much better conducted. Unfortunately, these works usually fail to acknowledge adequately the great benefit of hindsight and will often ignore many confounding factors in the original scenario. Perhaps no war has had so many alleged missed opportunities as the First World War. This chapter will consider whether there were any missed opportunities connected with the first combat engagement of the French tanks on 16 April 1917, including a consideration of a number of criticisms made about the engagement by Heinz Guderian, the German armour expert.
1 The tank engagement was widely seen as a failure at the time and afterwards; for example, Guderian argues in his 1937 book Achtung Panzer that the French tanks should have given a much better showing on 16 April 1917. To claim this engagement was a missed opportunity, as Guderian does, is to strongly imply that there was a failure of vision, but this case study will show that it was not any lack of imagination in the tank officers' plans but the hard reality of immature technology and a misjudged approach by the French commander-in-chief General Robert Nivelle to the offensive in general that caused the tank attack to fail. In addition, this study of the French tanks in the Nivelle Offensive will demonstrate that failure in the short term can be a spur leading to long-term success.
By 1917, the French and British had already missed a major opportunity by failing to co-operate at the outset in their tank programmes. It is very telling about the Anglo-French relationship in the first half of the war that neither side informed the other about its tank programme until they were both well underway. As soon as the French were informed about the British programme in June 1916, the commander of the French Tank Corps (the Artillerie Spéciale -AS), Colonel (later General) Jean Baptiste Estienne, was despatched to Lincoln to see what the British had achieved.
2 Although Estienne was most impressed with the British tank and recommended immediate co-operation, it was difficult at this late stage because the British and French tank designs were so different.
As far as the French were concerned, the British missed a major opportunity by using tanks for the first time during the final stages of the Battle of the Somme in 1916. This had in one fell swoop removed the surprise element of the tanks and forced the French to completely reconsider their tactical approach. Estienne's initial ideas on tactics had centred on the tanks being used in a surprise attack across a wide front, without an accompanying artillery barrage. For the attack, the tanks would leave the French front line before the infantry, who would only advance to the first enemy trench when the tanks had taken it. Several hundred metres behind the tanks conducting the assault would be tanks towing sledges carrying infantry for exploiting the attack.
3 Such was French concern that the French government contacted E.S. Montague, the British Minister of Munitions, and asked him to stop the British tanks being used until the spring of 1917, when the French tanks would be ready. Montague discussed this with Haig in September 1916 but the latter, although sympathetic, was not prepared to change his plans at such a late stage. 4 Although the French were furious that the British were not prepared to delay the introduction into combat of the tank, they were certainly asking a lot if they expected the British in the second half of 1916 to wait until enough French tanks were available for a large-scale attack, as this was at least six months away. The British knew about the serious delays in the French tank programme and could thus be reasonably certain that their tanks would not see action for a lengthy period if they waited for the French to be ready. 5 On the other hand, this appeared to be an opportunity for the French to gain important information from the British experience. Unfortunately, as was typical in the Great War, it was difficult to discern which parts of the British experience were generally applicable and which were particular to that engagement. For example, the commander of the French military mission to GHQ, General Pierre des Vallières, made an initial report on the British tanks which suggested that direct artillery fire would not be a problem for the tanks. This was highly misleading, as the French were to find out. 6 On the other hand, J.L. Breton (an early enthusiast for tanks in the French Armaments
